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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Property insurance in Florida has long been regulated by the Val-
ued Policy Law.1 Its aim is simple: to prevent litigation and promote 
fairness to consumers of insurance by requiring that, in the event of 
a total loss to a building, an insurer pay the full value of the policy 
limits under the insurance contract. The law protects homeowners 
and facilitates the quick settlement of claims by preventing the in-
surer from claiming that the structure was, in fact, worth less than 
the amount it was insured for. 
 The application of the Valued Policy Law in Florida has led to a 
great deal of controversy in the aftermath of recent busy hurricane 
seasons. In the summer of 2004, the state of Florida was pummeled 
by four strong hurricanes, leading to massive losses to property and 
                                                                                                                     
 *  J.D., 2007, Florida State University; B.A., 2004, Psychology, Wake Forest Univer-
sity. Thanks to Professor Eric Knutsen and the Editors & Staff of the Florida State Univer-
sity Law Review for their assistance in developing this Article and to my family for their un-
ending love and support. Comments are welcome at scottjedwards@gmail.com. 
 1. FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (2005). 
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placing great strain on the continued ability of insurers to provide 
property coverage in the state. The insurance system’s problems fol-
lowing such a devastating hurricane season have been exacerbated 
by the Florida District Court of Appeal decisions in Mierzwa v. Flor-
ida Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n2 and Florida Farm Bureau Casu-
alty Insurance Co. v. Cox,3 which have exposed the insurers by mak-
ing them potentially liable for a large amount of damage not covered 
under most homeowners’ insurance contracts.  
The typical homeowners property insurance policy protects 
against damages caused by windstorm, but excludes coverage for 
damages caused by flooding.4 Thus, in order to be covered for losses 
caused by flood, a homeowner must obtain a separate flood insurance 
policy. Hurricanes pose a unique problem to the settling of property 
claims because they frequently cause damage by two major perils: 
wind, which is covered, and flood, which is typically not. Conflict 
thus frequently ensues over the extent a given property was dam-
aged by flood, rather than by wind. The Mierzwa court, however, ap-
plied the Valued Policy Law in a manner that will require windstorm 
insurers to pay out their full policy limits on a property, despite 
flooding being a significant factor in the damage caused by the hurri-
cane.5 Even when homeowners have received payments from sepa-
rate flood insurance, they are still allowed to collect the full value of 
the property from the windstorm insurer under the Mierzwa ruling. 
This creates two possible problems: either the insured homeowner 
gets coverage for damage caused by flooding without having to pur-
chase flood insurance or the homeowner who has elected to purchase 
flood insurance will receive a windfall payment in excess of the total 
value of its loss.  
 This Comment analyzes how the property insurance landscape of 
Florida has been reshaped by the impact of recent hurricanes. Part II 
explores the history, initial equitable justifications, and intended ap-
plications of the Valued Policy Law. This Part also demonstrates that 
the original Valued Policy Law did not contemplate concurrent cau-
sation generally or hurricane damages specifically. Part III examines 
the majority’s decision in Mierzwa, as well as the insurance indus-
try’s reaction to the case. This part also considers legislation that has 
ensued in response to Mierzwa. Part IV takes a deeper look at the 
                                                                                                                     
 2. 877 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 
 3. 943 So. 2d 823(Fla. 1st DCA 2006). 
 4. “Virtually all homeowners’ insurance policies exclude flood, which has tradition-
ally been a separately insured risk.” Id. at 836 n.11 (Polston, J., dissenting). The Federal 
Government has noted that private insurers rarely provide flood insurance, as they are 
unable to make it available at reasonable rates. See Flick v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 205 
F.3d 386, 387-89 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 5. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 776-80. 
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Mierzwa decision, considering the negative consequences of applying 
its holding in various hurricane damage scenarios. Part V evaluates 
alternative interpretations to the Valued Policy Law which would 
achieve the goals of the law in a fair and just way, with emphasis on 
Judge Gross’s concurring opinion in Mierzwa. Part VI explains the 
amendments the Florida Legislature made in response to Mierzwa 
and examines how the amendments change the interpretation of the 
Valued Policy Law. Part VII concludes. 
II.   THE VALUED POLICY LAW  
A.   Florida's Valued Policy Law 
 Florida’s Valued Policy Law was first enacted in 1899.6 Prior to its 
amendment in 2005,7 it stated in relevant part that “[i]n the event of 
the total loss of any building . . . located in this state and insured by 
any insurer as to a covered peril, . . . the insurer’s liability, if any, . . . 
shall be in the amount of money for which such property was so in-
sured as specified in the policy.”8 The law serves to “simplify and fa-
cilitate prompt settlement of insurance claims when a total loss oc-
curs” by setting the property’s value before a loss occurs.9 A proper 
valuation of property after a total loss is often difficult to ascertain, 
because most evidence of the property’s worth has been destroyed.10 
The statute also facilitates the settling of claims by making matters 
such as depreciation of the property irrelevant.11 The state of the law 
before the Valued Policy Law led to “suspicions of and opportunities 
for false or exaggerated claims on the one hand,” and to “accusations, 
minimizations and oppressions on the other.”12 The Valued Policy 
Law reduces this potential for conflict over the value of the property 
by acting as a measure of liquidated damages.13 The Valued Policy Law 
also benefits insureds by discouraging insurers from writing policies 
with excessive coverage in order to charge higher premiums.14 
 A “total loss” to the covered property is required to trigger the 
Valued Policy Law.15 A property can also be deemed a “constructive 
                                                                                                                     
 6. John V. Garaffa, Florida’s “Valued Policy” Law: The Eye of the Storm, FLA. B.J., 
Apr. 2005, at 8, 8.  
 7. See Act effective June 1, 2005, ch. 2005-111, 2005 Fla. Laws 1063, 1092-93; see 
also discussion infra Part VI.  
 8. FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (2003). 
 9. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 167 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Am. Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Robinson, 163 So. 17, 19 (1935). 
 12. Boswell, 167 So. 2d at 784; see also Am. Ins. Co. v. Gentile Bros. Co., 109 F.2d 732 
(5th Cir. 1940). 
 13. Boswell, 167 So. 2d at 784. 
 14. Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n, 877 So. 2d 774, 780 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2004) (Gross, J., concurring specially) (citing 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1500 (2003)). 
 15. FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (2005). 
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total loss” if the demolition of the structure is required by statute or 
local ordinance.16 Many municipalities have ordinances requiring 
damaged buildings to be reconstructed in conformance with building 
codes in force at the time of repairs when these repairs and altera-
tions cost more than fifty percent of the existing building’s value.17 In 
such situations, a constructive total loss occurs because “the building 
has been so damaged as to lose its identity, or has been so nearly 
completely destroyed that a reasonably prudent owner would not 
care to take the chance of using those parts which remain stand-
ing.”18 Constructive total losses frequently occur in properties dam-
aged by hurricanes, because laws in many flood-prone areas require 
that property which suffers substantial loss be elevated to heights 
required by building codes in effect at the time of reconstruction.19 
For example, approximately three thousand homeowners in Dade 
County whose homes were damaged by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 
were ineligible for building permits because their homes were at ele-
vations below those required by subsequent federal guidelines.20 An 
existing structure must almost always be demolished before the land 
can be elevated to conform to building codes.21 
B.   The Valued Policy Law in Other States 
 Eighteen states, in addition to Florida, have valued policy laws.22 
These laws differ, however, in both the covered perils that trigger the 
valued policy law and the method of recovery in the event of concur-
rent policies.23 As to covered perils, Florida is fairly unique in its ap-
plication of its Valued Policy Law to any covered peril—only Mon-
                                                                                                                     
 16. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 780 (Gross, J., concurring). 
 17. See, e.g., FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., ORDINANCES § 104.3(e), quoted in Mierzwa, 877 
So. 2d at 776 n.3. 
 18. Occhipinti v. Boston Ins. Co., 72 So. 2d 326, 330 (La. Ct. App. 1954). 
 19. See Hugh L. Wood, Jr., Comment, The Insurance Fallout Following Hurricane 
Andrew: Whether Insurance Companies Are Legally Obligated to Pay for Building Code 
Upgrades Despite the “Ordinance or Law” Exclusion Contained in Most Homeowners Poli-
cies, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 952-54 (1994).  
 20. Id. at 954 (citing Don Fine Frock, Insurance Could Pay to Elevate Houses, MIAMI 
HERALD, Nov. 18, 1992, at 1A). 
 21. See Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 776 n.3. 
 22. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-88-101 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-32-5 (2006); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-905 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 22:695 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 654.01 (2006); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-13-5 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 379.140 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-
24-102 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-501.02 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 407:11 (2006); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-39-05 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.25-.26 (2006); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 36, § 4804 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-75-20 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-
10 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-802 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-17-9 (2006); WIS. 
STAT. § 632.05 (2005). 
 23. See Kristin Hual & Michael Schofield, Valued Policy Law: A Historical Perspective 
on the Compounding Equation, TRIAL ADVOCATE Q., Summer 2005, at 29, 31. 
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tana,24 Nebraska,25 North Dakota,26 Wisconsin,27 and arguably West 
Virginia28 have statutes applicable to such a broad range of covered per-
ils. Most states limit their valued policy laws to losses caused by fire.29  
 Florida is the only coastal state where the Valued Policy Law is 
broad enough to encompass losses caused by hurricane. Other states 
which frequently experience hurricanes have narrow valued policy 
laws, or none at all.30 Most significantly, valued policy laws will not 
be an issue in Louisiana or Mississippi, the states hardest hit by 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Both states’ valued policy laws are explicitly 
limited to loss caused by fire.31 Concurrent causation, though, is still a 
major issue in settling claims arising out of Hurricane Katrina.32 
 The second way in which valued policy laws differ is how they ad-
dress recovery in respect to concurrent policies by addressing differ-
ent perils or causes of loss. Most states’ valued policy laws follow 
Florida’s “aggregate” system, which requires multiple insurers who 
insure the same property for the same covered peril to both tender 
                                                                                                                     
 24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-24-102 (2005) (“Whenever any policy of insurance shall be 
written to insure any improvements upon real property in this state against loss or dam-
age and the property insured is considered to be a total loss, . . . the amount of insurance 
written in such policy shall be taken conclusively to be the true value of the property in-
sured and the true amount of loss and measure of damages.”). 
 25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-501.02 (2006) (“Whenever any policy of insurance is written 
to insure any real property in this state against loss by fire, tornado, windstorm, lightning, 
or explosion and the property insured is wholly destroyed . . . the amount of the insurance 
written in such policy shall be taken conclusively to be the true value of the property in-
sured and the true amount of loss and measure of damages.”). 
 26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-39-05 (2005). 
 27. WIS. STAT. § 632.05 (2005). Chapter 632, subsection I, applies to “Fire and Other 
Property Insurance.” Id.  
 28. West Virginia’s valued policy law is somewhat ambiguous: “All insurers providing 
fire insurance on real property in West Virginia shall be liable, in case of total loss by fire 
or otherwise . . . .” W. VA. CODE § 33-17-9 (2006) (emphasis added). All reported cases from 
West Virginia, however, have only involved fire damage. See id. 
 29. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-32-5 (2006). 
 30. Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina are states vulnerable to hur-
ricanes which have Valued Policy Laws which apply only to fire insurance. See supra note 
22 and accompanying text. 
 31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:695 (2006), MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-13-5 (2006); see also 
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 322 F.2d 803, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1963) (noting 
that losses caused by windstorm do not fall under Louisiana’s valued policy law). But see 
Fran Matso Lysiak, Coverage Disputes Inevitable After Katrina, BEST’S REV., Oct. 1, 2005, 
at 11, available at 2005 WLNR 17050317 (quoting Louisiana insurance expert W. Shelby 
McKenzie’s claims that “Louisiana’s ‘Valued Policy Law’ is similar to Florida’s” and that 
the language of its Valued Policy Law has not been interpreted since the law’s reenactment 
in 1992. Thus, “Louisiana courts ‘would certainly have access to the Florida decision [in 
Mierzwa] . . . . They could either follow that decision or make their own determination of 
the meaning of the Louisiana statute.’ ”). 
 32. See, e.g., Michael Kunzelman, State Farm Accused of Destroying Evidence, MIAMI 
HERALD, Apr. 11, 2006, at C3 (describing U.S. Senator Trent Lott’s accusations that State 
Farm manipulated engineering reports to interpret losses in Mississippi from Hurricane 
Katrina to be caused by flood, in spite of evidence indicating that losses were due to wind-
storm). 
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full policy limits.33 Under this approach, if the insured has overin-
sured himself with the knowledge of both insurers, the insurers are 
still liable to pay full liabilities. Several states, however, take a pro 
rata approach to the allocation of recovery when multiple policies 
cover the same loss.34 Under the pro rata approach, all the insurers are 
liable for a percentage of the overall loss, resulting in the insured be-
ing compensated for the actual value of the loss and nothing more.35 
III.   MIERZWA AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 Florida’s Valued Policy Law was designed to address losses involv-
ing a single, covered peril. Since the Valued Policy Law was first en-
acted in 1899, the nature of property insurance and the Valued Pol-
icy Law have both changed. Property insurance has expanded from 
its origin as fire insurance to “all risks” insurance,36 and the Valued 
Policy Law has likewise been expanded to apply to all covered perils, 
not just fire.37  The Valued Policy Law’s application in the context of 
concurrent causation—combining a covered peril and an excluded 
peril—was first explored by Florida courts in Mierzwa v. Florida 
Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n.38 Part III.A will examine the 
Mierzwa court’s application of the Valued Policy Law and its holding, 
which requires an insurer pay its full policy limits under the Valued 
Policy Law so long as there is any loss caused by any covered peril. 
Part III.B details the reaction to the Mierzwa case, from the perspec-
tive of both the insurance industry and advocates of property owners. 
Part III.C explores the implications for the insurance industry aris-
ing out of increased hurricane frequency and denser populations in 
hurricane-prone areas. Part III.D will examine the litigation that has 
arisen in the aftermath of the Mierzwa holding, most notably the 
case of Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Cox.39 
A.   The Mierzwa Case 
 Florida’s Valued Policy law was first applied in the context of mul-
tiple-causation hurricane damages in Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (2005); GA. CODE. ANN. § 33-32-5 (2006); see also 
Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 167 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). 
 34. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-39-05(1)(c) (2005) (“In case of double insurance, 
each insurer shall contribute proportionally toward the loss without regard to the dates of 
the insurance policies.”); see also Bumann v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 312 N.W.2d 
459, 463 (N.D. 1981) (requiring pro rata distribution of loss among policies when multiple 
policies cover the same property).  
 35. Bumann, 312 N.W.2d at 463 n.5 (setting forth the pro rata formula for determin-
ing each insurer’s individual liability to the insured). 
 36. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 173 (4th ed. 2005). 
 37. Garaffa, supra note 6, at 8. 
 38. 877 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 
 39. 31 Fla. L. Weekly D2679 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). 
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Underwriting Ass’n.40 In that case, the insured’s property suffered 
extensive wind and flood damage caused by Hurricane Irene.41 The 
insured had separate insurance policies provided by different insur-
ers: one for wind damage and a second for flood damage.42 The policy 
covering wind damage specifically excluded coverage for any dam-
ages not caused by wind.43 
 The wind insurer valued the damage due to wind at $73,177,44 
while the flood insurer valued damage due to flooding at $54,485.45 
Although the property was not totally destroyed, it was deemed to 
have suffered damage which would cost more than fifty percent of its 
existing value to replace.46 An ordinance of the City of Fort Lauder-
dale required it to be repaired in a manner that brought it into con-
formance with current building codes.47 Most importantly, bringing 
the property up to code required demolishing the existing structure in 
order to elevate the site.48 Because the structure had to be demolished 
under the code, the property was rendered a “constructive total loss.”49 
 The insured brought suit, claiming that the Florida Valued Policy 
Law50 required that the windstorm insurer tender its full policy lim-
its due under the policy.51 The insurer argued, and the trial court 
agreed, that the insurer was liable only for its pro rata share of the 
damage because flooding was also a factor in the loss.52 The Fourth 
District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling, however, 
holding that the Valued Policy Law required tendering of the full pol-
icy limits53 notwithstanding the flood damage exclusion and the exis-
tence of a separate flood insurer. 
 The Mierzwa court arrived at its decision largely by interpreting 
the language of the Valued Policy Law and the insurance policy at is-
sue. The court found the meaning of the Valued Policy Law to be 
“simple and straightforward.”54 It found that two elements were nec-
essary to find that the Valued Policy Law applied. First, the struc-
                                                                                                                     
 40. 877 So. 2d 774. 
 41. Id. at 775-76. 
 42. Id. at 775. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 776 (totaling $64,807 for damages, plus $8370 for debris removal and other costs). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (citing FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., ORDINANCES § 104.3(e)). 
 48. Id. at 776 n.3. 
 49. Id. at 780 (Gross, J., concurring specially). 
 50. FLA. STAT. § 627.702(1) (2003); see Part VI, infra, for discussion on the Valued 
Policy Law’s 2005 amendment in response to Mierzwa. 
 51. See Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 775, 777-79. 
 54. Id. at 775. 
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ture must be “insured by [an] insurer as to a . . . covered peril.”55 Sec-
ond, the building must be a total loss.56 If both these elements exist, 
the court held the Valued Policy Law applies without regard to any 
other fact that may be present in the case. That means that “if the 
insurance carrier has any liability at all to the owner for a building 
damaged by a covered peril and deemed a total loss, that liability is 
for the face amount of the policy.”57 Thus, the court held, the covered 
peril need not be the sole cause, or even the major cause, of the dam-
age in order for the Valued Policy Law to apply.58 
 Furthermore, the court held that the policy’s anticoncurrent cause 
clause (ACCC), which specifically excluded flood damage, did not 
serve to override the Valued Policy Law. The policy was silent as to 
the insurer’s liability when coverage for other perils was provided by 
different carriers.59 Therefore, the court reasoned that there was a 
conflict between the ACCC and the Valued Policy Law.60 The court 
resolved this ambiguity by referring to a long-standing maxim of in-
surance policy construction: when there are two fair interpretations 
of an insurance policy, it will be construed in favor of providing cov-
erage.61 Thus, the court held that the Valued Policy Law must super-
cede any exclusion in the policy.62 
 The Mierzwa court also rejected the insurer’s proposition that a 
pro rata apportionment of damages would be appropriate under the 
Valued Policy Law. Relying on Millers’ Mutual Insurance Ass’n of Il-
linois v. La Pota,63 the court held that pro rata apportionment is con-
trary to the Valued Policy Law.64 Under La Pota, when an insured is 
permitted to seek coverage from multiple insurers, the insured is 
able to recover the full policy limits from all policies that may exist 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 627.702(1) (2003)). 
 56. Id. at 775. 
 57. Id. at 775-76. 
 58. Id. at 776. The court declined to consider arguments made by the insurer regard-
ing the potential “parade of horribles” that would result if the Valued Policy Law were to 
be applied when the covered peril is responsible for a miniscule fraction of the overall loss. 
Id. at 778 n.5; see discussion at infra Part IV. 
 59. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 777. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 777-78. 
 62. Id. at 778. 
 63. 197 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). 
 64. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 778. In La Pota, the Second DCA found that a pro rata 
clause in an insurance contract, which purported to limit the insurer’s liability to its frac-
tional share of insurance on the building, was not permissible under the Valued Policy 
Law. La Pota, 197 So. 2d at 22. The purpose behind the Valued Policy Law, the court held, 
was to form an agreement on the value of the insurance on the property at the time it is 
written. Id. at 24. Thus, “[e]ach insurer is liable for the full amount of his policy, provided, 
of course, there is no fraud or other conduct of the insured which would constitute a valid 
defense to an action to recover for [the full value of the policy].” Id. When there are multi-
ple policies covering a given property, “[t]he aggregate liability is the total of the various 
values specified and for which an appropriate premium has been paid.” Id. 
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on the property.65 Had the insurer in Mierzwa desired to restrict its 
exposure so that it would not be liable for other damages under the 
Valued Policy Law, it should have included an explicit clause in the 
policy making such a limitation.66 
B.   Reaction to and Criticism of Mierzwa 
 Representatives of property owners had an overwhelmingly posi-
tive reaction to the Mierzwa decision. Commentators noted that the 
meaning of the Valued Policy Law was clear as written and that the 
Mierzwa court simply interpreted the statute as written.67 Jason 
Richards, writing in the Florida Bar Journal, argued that the courts 
did not have the authority “to find ‘unjust’ something that the statute 
specifically permits,” thus any complaints about the Mierzwa case 
should be addressed to the legislature.68 
 The thrust of the argument in favor of Mierzwa lies in the inter-
pretation of the Valued Policy Law as a “calculated risk.” Under this 
interpretation of Florida’s Valued Policy Law, the law acts as a liqui-
dated damages clause, rendering unimportant any insurance the in-
sured has procured from other parties.69 When an insurer does not 
explicitly limit additional coverage on a structure, “it does so at its 
own risk, and the company cannot then take the position that there 
should be a narrow, restrictive interpretation of the coverage to avoid 
its contractual (and statutory) duties.”70 
 But representatives of the insurance industry counter that such 
interpretations of calculated risk will have an extremely adverse im-
pact on the availability and affordability of property insurance in 
Florida. The Mierzwa decision has caused a great deal of panic 
within Florida’s insurance industry, especially in the aftermath of 
2004’s catastrophic hurricane season.71 According to those who repre-
sent the insurance industry, Mierzwa’s broad interpretation of the 
responsibilities of an insurer under the Valued Policy Law will “open 
the floodgates” to a “significant amount of litigation.”72 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 778 (citing La Pota, 197 So. 2d at 24). 
 66. Id. The court held that the limitation would be necessary to make the insurer’s in-
terpretation “arguably possible,” due to the rule of construction that interprets ambiguities 
in insurance policies in favor of the insured. Id. The court declined to address whether 
such a limiting clause would be legal under the Valued Policy Law. Id. at 778-79. 
 67. See, e.g., R. Jason Richards, Florida’s “Valued Policy Law”: Clarifying Some Re-
cent Misconceptions, FLA. B.J., Dec. 2005, at 18, 18-19. 
 68. Id. at 20. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Robert Groelle, Florida’s Valued Policy Law: An Insurer’s Obligations for Addi-
tional Coverages After Mierzwa v. FWUA, TRIAL ADVOCATE Q., Winter 2005, at 19. 
 72. Id. at 22. 
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 One commentator considers the Mierzwa decision to be a “Cate-
gory Five”73 to the insurance industry, contrary to established princi-
ples of insurance and contract law.74 The Mierzwa decision, he ar-
gues, greatly increases the likelihood of litigation over the Valued 
Policy Law.75 Even absent the Mierzwa case, the legal system is 
structured to favor litigation in insurance coverage cases. Insurance 
litigation frequently involves a large sum of money; thus, “the in-
surer’s costs of litigation are often substantially less than its expo-
sure,” while the insured has incentive to litigate (and to reject insuf-
ficient settlements) because its costs are usually borne by the attor-
ney under the contingent fee system, rather than the insured itself.76 
These incentives have been exacerbated by Mierzwa and its progeny. 
Insureds now have a greater incentive to seek their property to be 
declared an actual or constructive total loss because such a determi-
nation may afford the insured “a windfall of double policy limits.”77 
Likewise, insurers now have a greater resolve to vigorously litigate 
claims under the Valued Policy Law in hopes of avoiding the poten-
tial of “tender[ing] policy limits even when virtually all the damage 
has been caused by a peril which is excluded under the policy.”78 Be-
cause of this, the Mierzwa decision will result in “an unfortunate 
economic impact on the cost of property insurance in Florida.”79 
 Representatives of the insurance industry advocate interpreting 
the Valued Policy Law under the indemnity theory, rather than the 
calculated risk theory. As long as an obligation to pay full policy lim-
its for damage caused primarily by an excluded peril “is now a ‘calcu-
lated risk,’ the carriers could be excused if they decided that future 
premiums should be raised to reflect the risk of all possible perils.”80 
Garaffa notes that the cases relied upon by Richards81 all involve 
cases in which insureds had multiple policies covering the same peril.82 
Mierzwa and its progeny are distinguishable because they address loss 
caused by two separate perils, insured under two separate policies.83 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Garaffa, supra note 6, at 13. 
 74. Id. at 18. 
 75. Id. at 20. 
 76. Banks McDowell, Causation in Contracts & Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV. 569, 591 (1988). 
 77. Garaffa, supra note 6, at 20. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 18, 20. 
 80. John V. Garaffa, Author’s Response to Valued Policy Law Article, FLA. B.J., Jan. 
2006, at 4, 30. 
 81. See, e.g., Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 167 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1964). See generally Richards, supra note 67, at 19-20. 
 82. Garaffa, supra note 80, at 4. 
 83. Id. 
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C.   The Impact of Recent Busy Hurricane Seasons on the  
Valued Policy Law 
 Recent severe hurricane seasons have had an immense impact on 
the insurance industry. A major problem is that many current insur-
ance regimes were implemented during a lull in the cycle of hurri-
canes. A report by the Insurance Services Offices (ISO) notes that 
“[f]or many years, insurers and their customers benefited from a lull 
in major storm activity.”84 Between 1969 and 1989, for example, the 
United States did not experience a single “severe” hurricane85 and 
only experienced nine “intense” hurricanes from 1970-1989.86 A 
string of severe hurricanes has hit the United States in the last fif-
teen years: Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Hurricane Andrew in 1992, and 
Hurricane Charley in 2004.87 In addition to Charley, Florida was 
struck by three other major hurricanes in 2004: Frances (Category 
Two),88 Ivan (Category Three),89 and Jeanne (Category Three).90 The 
2005 Hurricane Season was also highly active, represented most no-
tably by Hurricane Katrina, a Category Three storm upon landfall 
that was “the costliest” and “one of the most devastating natural dis-
asters in United States history.”91 Because of high rates of building in 
hurricane-prone areas and market forces during the “lull” period, 
“[t]he favorable experience during the lull, compounded by the pres-
sures for market share and the dynamics of competition, may have 
led some insurers and reinsurers to be overexposed to severe catas-
trophes.”92 The insurance industry will continue to be vexed by prob-
                                                                                                                     
 84. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., THE IMPACT OF CATASTROPHES ON PROPERTY INSURANCE 
6 (1994). 
 85. Id. at 7. A “severe hurricane” is defined by the ISO as a Category Four or Five 
storm on the Saffir-Simpson scale, with sustained wind speeds exceeding 130 miles per 
hour. Id. 
 86. Id. at 6. An “intense hurricane” is defined as a Category Three or higher storm, 
with sustained wind speeds exceeding 110 miles per hour. Id. 
 87. Id.; RICHARD J. PASCH ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE 
REPORT: HURRICANE CHARLEY 1 (2005), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-
AL032004_Charley.pdf. 
 88. JOHN L. BEVEN II, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: 
HURRICANE FRANCES 1 (2004), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-
AL062004_Frances.pdf. 
 89. STACY R. STEWART, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: 
HURRICANE IVAN 2 (2005), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-
AL092004_Ivan.pdf.  
 90. MILES B. LAWRENCE & HUGH D. COBB, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL 
CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE JEANNE 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL112004_Jeanne.pdf. 
 91. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE 
REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (2005), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-
AL122005_Katrina.pdf. 
 92. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 84, at 6. 
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lems with hurricanes as population densities increase on hurricane-
prone lands.93 
 In light of the increasing frequency and intensity of hurricanes—
as well as increased population on the coast—the philosophy of prop-
erty insurance as applied to hurricanes may have to be readjusted. 
Many of the problems in applying the Valued Policy Law, in the con-
text of insured hurricane losses, arise from the law’s original limita-
tion to damages caused by fire or lightning.94 In 1969, the Florida 
Legislature amended the Valued Policy Law to cover total losses 
caused by any covered peril.95 This opened the door to recovery for 
losses caused by hurricanes; however, it is likely that the legislature 
did not contemplate the complexities that would arise out of hurri-
cane disputes. As one commentator notes: “The problem with 
Mierzwa is clear: The court is trying to fit a 2004 fact pattern into a 
100-year-old statute.”96 
 Outmoded insurance policy language frequently has to be adapted 
to conform to changes in the law, technology, and society. Because of 
the insurance industry’s own reluctance to change the language of 
these policies, however, coverage and payment mechanisms that 
made sense in years past grow unwieldy and unworkable as time 
progresses. A particularly poignant analysis of such dilemmas can be 
found in the pollution exclusion cases. American States Insurance Co. 
v. Koloms97 provides a comprehensive review of the problems associ-
ated with the exclusion and addresses how courts should interpret 
insurance contracts in light of changing societal conditions. In hold-
ing that the language of an insurance contract should not be strictly 
construed when doing so would lead to an absurd result, the court 
noted that it “would be remiss, therefore, if [the court] were to simply 
look to the bare words of the exclusion, ignore its raison d' être, and 
apply it to situations which do not remotely resemble traditional en-
vironmental contamination.”98 Judge Richard A. Posner, noting that 
the law is malleable and has a “pragmatic rather than dogmatic 
character,” has also warned against the dangers of blind strict con-
struction of the law leading to absurd results:  
The law is not absolute, and the slogan . . . ‘Let justice be done 
though the heavens fall’[ ] is dangerous nonsense. The law is a hu-
man creation rather than a divine gift, a tool of government rather 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Id. at 9. The population density of hurricane-prone lands in the United States has 
risen from 259 people per square mile in 1960 to a projected 421 people per square mile in 
2010. Id.  
 94. See Garaffa, supra note 6, at 8. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 16. 
 97. 687 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1997). 
 98. Id. at 81. 
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than a mandarin mystery. It is an instrument for promoting social 
welfare, and as the conditions essential to that welfare change, so 
must it change.99 
 Similarly, the maxims of statutory construction in Florida could 
have guided the Mierzwa court to rule in a manner more consistent 
with the purposes and intent of the Valued Policy Law. The court in 
Childers v. Cape Canaveral Hospital, Inc.100 explained the duty of a 
court interpreting ambiguous laws: 
Courts should not construe a statute so as to achieve an absurd re-
sult. A literal interpretation of the statutory language used is not 
required when to do so would lead to an unreasonable conclusion, 
defeat legislative intent or result in a manifest incongruity. “[I]f 
from a view of the whole law, or from other laws in pari materia 
the evident intent is different from the literal import of the terms 
employed to express it in a particular part of the law, that intent 
should prevail, for that, in fact is the will of the Legislature.”101 
 The court in Mierzwa would have been justified in recognizing 
that the situation at issue was a matter of first impression, and it 
could have applied the Valued Policy Law in a manner that would 
have been fair and consistent with the expectations of all parties to 
the insurance contract. 
D.   Litigation Resulting from the Mierzwa Decision 
 Although courts have considered the cases in this section to be a 
“narrow class,”102 the Mierzwa decision has indeed spawned a great 
deal of litigation concerning the application of the Valued Policy Law 
in the aftermath of the 2004 hurricane season.  
1.   Scylla Properties, LLC v. Citizens Property Insurance Corp.103 
 Scylla Properties is a class action involving Valued Policy Claims 
arising from the 2004 hurricane season. The trial court certified the 
class as  
All persons whose Citizens-insured structures were damaged in 
the 2004 hurricanes by a combination of wind and flood in an 
amount giving rise to an actual or constructive total loss of the in-
sured structures, other than those whose . . . structures were lo-
                                                                                                                     
 99. Richard A. Posner, Security Versus Civil Liberties, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
TERRORISM: HOW 9/11 CHANGED U.S. POLITICS 61-62 (Allan J. Cigler ed., 2002). 
 100. 898 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). 
 101. Id. at 975 (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 
2d 452 (Fla. 1992) (citations omitted). 
 102. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 943 So. 2d 823, 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).  
 103. No. 05 CA 01 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2005). 
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cated in the counties of Broward, Indian River, Martin, Okeecho-
bee, Palm Beach or St. Lucie.104  
The plaintiffs argued that the Valued Policy Law as interpreted by 
the Mierzwa court defines Citizens’ liability “from the first scintilla of 
‘loss’ or ‘damage’ to its ‘[l]imit of [l]iability.’ ”105  
 Citizens contended that the Mierzwa court misinterpreted the 
Valued Policy Law statute: “Citizens submits that [the] ‘if any’ [lan-
guage in the statute] refers to whether the carrier has liability under 
the policy for a total loss.”106 Thus, “[i]f a carrier has liability for a to-
tal loss, its liability is for the face amount of the policy”; however, “if 
a carrier does not have liability for a total loss, the valued policy law 
simply does not apply.”107  
 Citizens also argued that the trial court was not bound by 
Mierzwa because of a First District Court of Appeal opinion that ad-
dressed the issue of coverage in hurricanes.108 Citizens relied upon 
Opar v. Allstate Insurance Co.109 to argue the inapplicability of 
Mierzwa in the trial court’s jurisdiction. In Opar, the plaintiff's’ 
beachfront home was destroyed by Hurricane Opal.110 The plaintiffs 
argued that their home was destroyed in part or whole by windstorm 
damage, a covered peril under the insurance contract.111 However, 
Allstate denied coverage on the grounds that the property was de-
stroyed by storm surge, an excluded peril.112 The Opar court noted 
that, on remand to the trial court, “[i]f, on the other hand, a coverage 
defense is determined successful in whole or in part,” determining 
that the loss was caused at least in part by storm surge, “then 
Allstate would either not be liable, or would be liable only in part for 
the amount.”113 The court’s ruling in Opar, however, was based upon 
the validity of appraisal provisions in insurance contracts.114 The 
court did not address the Valued Policy Law. Its silence can be inter-
preted in two ways: either the Valued Policy Law doesn’t apply in 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Findings and Order Certifying Class at 9-10, Scylla Props. (No. 05 CA 01). The ex-
cluded counties are under the jurisdiction of Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, 
where Mierzwa controls. 
 105. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Class a at 7, Scylla Props. (No. 05 CA 01). 
 106. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 16, Scylla Props. (No. 05 CA 01). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 17-18. 
 109. 751 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), disapproved of on other grounds by Johnson v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 828 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2002). 
 110. Id. at 759. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 761. 
 114. Id. at 759. 
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multiple causation issues, or because the holding was narrow, the 
language on liability is mere dicta.115 
 The trial court ruled that Citizens was indeed required under the 
Valued Policy Law to pay the full policy limits of all claims denied 
due to the existence of concurrent flood damage: “This Court is duty-
bound to follow the decision of the District Court in Mierzwa . . . 
unless this Court finds that the decision in Mierzwa was clearly de-
cided erroneously. I believe the Mierzwa case was correctly de-
cided.”116 If affirmed on appeal,117 Scylla Properties would present a 
rule far stricter than Mierzwa because the plaintiffs specifically 
plead that the liability of insurers under the Valued Policy Law be-
gins at “the first scintilla of ‘loss’ or ‘damage.’ ”118 
2.   Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Cox119 
 Following Mierzwa, the First District held in Cox that the Valued 
Policy Law in effect in 2004120 “forecloses an insurer’s challenge to 
the measure of damages in the event of a total loss.”121 The insureds’ 
property was rendered a total loss by Hurricane Ivan in 2004, dam-
aged by wind as well as by water.122 The opinion does not state 
whether there was a separate flood insurer, as was the case in 
Mierzwa. The Cox majority undertook a lengthy exercise in statutory 
construction to find that the literal statutory language of the Valued 
Policy Law requires windstorm insurers to pay full policy limits for 
covered property rendered a total loss when wind contributes to the 
                                                                                                                     
 115. The Cox court noted that the Valued Policy Law was not in issue in Opar. Fla. 
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 943 So. 2d 823, 835 n.9 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Likewise, 
Judge Polston noted in his dissent that the language from Opar was dicta. Id. at 841-82 
(Polston, J., dissenting).  
 116. Summary Final Judgment at 4, Scylla Props., LLC v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 
No. 05 CA 01 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2005). 
 117. The case is currently on appeal to Florida’s First District Court of Appeal, Case 
Number 1D05-3480. As this article went to press, the First District has issued two opin-
ions addressing various procedural issues, but has yet to rule on the merits. Citizens Prop. 
Ins. Co. v. Scylla Props., LLC, 946 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Litvak v. Scylla Props., 
LLC, 946 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In light of the First District’s recent holdings in 
Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Cox and Citizens Property Insurance Co. v. 
Ueberschaer, the court will almost certainly affirm Scylla Properties as well. See discussion 
infra Part III.D.2-3. 
 118. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Class a at 7, Scylla Properties v. 
Citizens Prop. Ins. Co. (No. 05 CA 01). 
 119. 943 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). 
 120. The Florida Legislature amended the Valued Policy Law in 2005 in response to 
Mierzwa. The legislature specifically noted that the amendment would not apply to any 
claims prior to the law’s enactment. The First District in Cox was thus bound to apply the 
law as it stood in 2004. See infra Part VI for a detailed discussion of the 2005 amendments 
and the Cox court’s treatment of these amendments. 
 121. Cox, 943 So. 2d at 826. 
 122. Id. 
556  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:541 
 
loss, regardless of any damage caused by flooding.123 The case is cur-
rently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.124 
3.   Citizens Property Insurance Co. v. Ueberschaer 
 The First District recently decided the case of Citizens Property 
Insurance Co. v. Ueberschaer on the authority of Mierzwa and Cox.125 
As was the case in Cox, Ueberschaer’s home was rendered a con-
structive total loss by Hurricane Ivan. Although Citizens, the wind-
storm insurer, conceded that some of the damages were caused by 
windstorm, it also argued that a significant amount of damages were 
caused by flooding. Judge Lewis, writing for the majority, held that 
payment of full policy limits under the Valued Policy Law should not 
be interpreted as payment for flood damages: “Ueberschaer is not 
making a claim for flood or water damages, [but rather] for wind-
storm damges and corresponding total loss costs by requesting a fixa-
tion of the measure of damages equal to the predetermined amount 
in the policy.”126 
 Ueberschaer is distinct from Mierzwa and Cox because it involves 
the liability of Citizens Property Insurance, which was created by the 
legislature with the express limitation to provide only windstorm 
coverage.127 Citizens argued that its enabling legislation prohibited 
the application of the Valued Policy Law to it, even in light of 
Mierzwa and its progeny. The court held, though, that the Valued 
Policy Law and the Citizens enabling legislation “address different 
situations,” and thus can both be applied. As noted above, the court 
considers full policy limits triggered by the Valued Policy Law to be 
wind damages, rather than flood damages. Judge Thomas, who was 
on the majority in Cox, dissented from the Ueberschaer majority’s de-
termination that Citizens should be held liable notwithstanding sig-
nificant flood damages. Noting that the legislature took great pains 
“to ensure that Citizens would not function as simply another private 
insurer,” Judge Thomas wrote that he did “not believe that the Legis-
lature could more clearly state its intent that Citizens shall not pro-
vide flood insurance, and that an applicant or insured cannot depend 
on Citizens for such coverage.” Therefore, he would have held that 
the Valued Policy Law does not apply to Citizens.  
                                                                                                                     
 123. Id. at 826-27. 
 124. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 948 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 2007). 
 125. 956 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). 
 126. Id. at 488 
 127. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6). 
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IV.   A "PARADE OF HORRIBLES": TAKING THE MIERZWA & COX 
DECISIONS SERIOUSLY 
 The Mierzwa court made a literal interpretation of the Valued 
Policy Law. All that is needed for the law to take effect is that the 
structure be insured for a covered peril and that the structure be 
considered a total loss.128 As discussed above, the courts applied the 
law as intended for single peril losses to the dual-peril losses at issue 
in these cases. The courts dismissed the insurers’ arguments that 
such a reading of the Valued Policy Law would result in insurers be-
ing liable for full policy limits when a covered peril is responsible for 
a minimal amount of the overall damage to the property.129 A serious 
reading of the Mierzwa and Cox decisions, however, allows for no 
other interpretation of the Valued Policy Law.  
 While the courts could have justifiably chosen to determine that 
the statute and the case law were silent on the Valued Policy Law’s 
application to concurrent causation issues—and were therefore inap-
plicable130—the courts instead labored to declare that the statute 
lacked ambiguity, thereby avoiding the need to traverse the jungle of 
statutory and insurance contract rules of construction. The Cox ma-
jority was especially reluctant to go beyond its literal interpretation 
of the statute: 
If the power the Florida Constitution assigns to the Legislature 
were ours instead, considerations like ease of actuarial analysis, 
the economics of the insurance industry, and even our own notions 
of fairness might well lead us to an interpretation of the 2004 
statute not unlike what the statute has required since it was sig-
nificantly revised in 2005.131 
The court, relying on principles of judicial restraint, declined to pass 
judgment on “the merits [of] either . . . version of the statute, matters 
which are properly for the Legislature . . . .”132 
 Examples such as the following illustrate the absurd results that 
would flow from a literal application of the Valued Policy Law as in-
terpreted in Mierzwa and Cox.133 A home is situated within a flood-
plain, is valued at $200,000, and is insured for the same amount un-
                                                                                                                     
 128. Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n, 877 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2004). 
 129. See id. at 778 n.5. 
 130. Judge Polston, dissenting in Cox, criticized the majority for going beyond the in-
tent of the statute as a valued policy law to require an insurer to pay for damages caused 
by excluded perils. Cox, 943 So. 2d at 836-37 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 826 (majority opinion).  
 132. Id. at 827. 
 133. Garraffa, supra note 80, at 30, mentions the possibility that “a single shingle . . . 
blown from the roof” could evoke Valued Policy Law coverage for flood damage. This hypo-
thetical scenario explores that assertion. 
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der a standard homeowner’s policy. The homeowner elects to not 
purchase flood insurance. A Category One hurricane hits the prop-
erty. The property experiences sustained winds no greater than 
eighty miles per hour, damaging only one window and removing sev-
eral tiles from the roof. The hurricane makes landfall near the prop-
erty at high tide, however, creating a storm surge that inundates the 
property with sea water. This results in extensive flood damage to 
the structure. The wind damage is accurately and in good faith esti-
mated by the homeowner's insurance adjuster to be valued at $5000. 
The damage caused by the floodwaters, however, is so severe that the 
structure is condemned pursuant to local building ordinances, result-
ing in a constructive total loss. 
 Under the first element of the Mierzwa test, a court would exam-
ine whether the property had sustained damage due to a covered 
peril.134 The property in this example has indeed satisfied this first 
element because it has sustained $5000 worth of windstorm damage. 
The second element is whether the structure is deemed to be a total 
loss.135 The property in the example has satisfied this element as 
well, because it has been condemned and was considered a construc-
tive total loss. The Mierzwa court explicitly states that the analysis 
ends here—because the two elements of the Valued Policy Law were 
met, the insurer is required to pay the full policy limits.136 Thus, 
damage to the property caused by the covered peril resulted in only 
2.5% of the overall cost of the damage to the property, yet the insurer 
is made liable for 100% of the face value of the policy. 
 This interpretation of the Valued Policy Law is contrary to the in-
tent of the law as drafted, as well as the principles of indemnity. 
Rather than being fair to both insureds and insurers, the law under 
the Mierzwa interpretation will certainly lead to confusion and 
higher premiums.137 The effect of exclusionary language in insurance 
policies has now been nullified because only “a scintilla of damage 
that could be attributed to a covered [peril]” is required to trigger the 
Valued Policy Law and recover full policy limits for damage caused 
by an excluded peril.138 The Valued Policy Law should not be con-
strued to give windfalls to insureds in the absence of a covered loss.139 
 The majority in Cox attempted to dismiss the concerns arising out 
of this argument. It noted that “[a]t the lower end of the spectrum—
                                                                                                                     
 134. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d. at 775.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. “If these two facts are true, the [Valued Policy Law] mandates that the carrier 
is liable to the owner for the face amount of the policy, no matter what other facts are in-
volved as to the cost of repairs or replacement.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 137. See Garaffa, supra note 80, at 30. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Ceballo, 934 So. 2d 536, 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The 
Ceballo court certified conflict with Mierzwa. Id. 
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where a covered peril causes only minor damage,” the Florida Stat-
utes require that “damage less than the deductible would not create 
‘any’ liability for the windstorm insurer.”140 While this addresses 
some of the hyperbole surrounding arguments that the Valued Policy 
Law applies beginning with the first scintilla of damage, the Mierzwa 
application of the law will still result in insurers being exposed to li-
ability for full policy limits when the covered peril caused only a 
small percentage of the overall damages. 
 Judge Polston, dissenting in Cox, noted that implicit in the statu-
tory language applying the Valued Policy Law to insurance contracts 
“for which a premium has been charged and paid”141 is a benefit of 
the bargain test.142 The insureds in these cases have not paid a pre-
mium to the homeowners’ insurers for flood insurance. Indeed, these 
policies explicitly exclude flood coverage. The Valued Policy Law 
should not be construed to require an insurer to cover flood damages 
when the peril is explicitly excluded from the policy and no premium 
has been paid for it.143  
V.   SOLUTIONS FOR A JUST TREATMENT OF HURRICANE DAMAGES 
UNDER THE VALUED POLICY LAW 
 The majority of states do not have valued policy laws, and most 
that do limit the law’s scope to damage by fire.144 Thus, in light of the 
Mierzwa case and the continued possibility of active hurricane sea-
sons in the future, should damage caused by hurricanes be excluded 
from the perils that trigger the Valued Policy Law? 
 The current controversy over Valued Policy Law claims has illus-
trated the law’s weakness in addressing damages caused by hurri-
canes. Valued policy laws are intended to reduce litigation by acting 
as liquidated damages clauses, setting the value of the insured prop-
erty and the obligations of the insurer before loss occurs.145 Litigation 
applying the Valued Policy Law has mushroomed since Mierzwa, 
however, frustrating the law’s aim of limiting court battles.146 By tak-
ing hurricane damage out of the domain of the Valued Policy Law, 
litigation would be focused on the damage caused by each peril, 
rather than over which peril caused the total loss of the structure. 
                                                                                                                     
 140. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 943 So. 2d 823, 834 n.7 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2006) (citing FLA. STAT. § 627.701 (2004)). 
 141. FLA. STAT. § 627.702(1) (2004). 
 142. Cox, 943 So. 2d at 843-44 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See discussion supra Part II. 
 145. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 167 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). 
 146. See discussion supra Part III.D concerning litigation that has been filed in re-
sponse to Mierzwa. 
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 Simply scrapping the Valued Policy Law, however, would not 
comport with the policy of the State of Florida and would be unfair to 
insureds. The Florida Legislature has recognized the Valued Policy 
Law’s “important role in ensuring that Florida policyholders are able 
to recover damages in the event their home is destroyed . . . .”147 The 
Valued Policy Law is most important in cases of constructive total 
loss. Absent the law, properties rendered a constructive total loss 
would not be eligible to receive full policy limits. Rather, the insurer 
would be likely to provide coverage for the actual costs of the damage 
and deny coverage for the losses caused by operation of the statute. 
 This Part will explore various methods for applying the Valued 
Policy Law to damages caused by hurricane, with the goal of finding 
a solution that is fair to both insured and insurer while advancing 
the public policy of Florida. Part V.A will first examine the proximate 
cause approach put forward by Judge Gross in his Mierzwa concur-
rence. Part V.B will address some of the shortcomings of Judge 
Gross’s approach, suggesting that a true pro rata approach would 
best allocate damages in the hurricane context.  
A.   The Mierzwa Concurrence–A Better Way? 
 Judge Gross’s concurrence in Mierzwa provides a better frame-
work for the fair and justifiable application of the Valued Policy Law 
to situations such as Mierzwa. Judge Gross explicitly disagreed with 
the majority’s holding that requires an insurer with any liability at 
all on a property that is a total loss to pay out its full policy limits 
under the Valued Policy Law.148 He wrote that “[t]he better rule is to 
require that a covered peril be the proximate cause of the total loss in 
order to trigger the valued policy law.”149 Under this analysis, a cov-
ered peril must pass a “but for” test in order to trigger the valued pol-
icy loss. In Mierzwa, for example, Judge Gross noted that applying a 
proximate cause analysis does not change the outcome of the case, 
“since it is clear that, but for the wind damage the ordinance would 
not have been brought into play.”150 Judge Gross also recognized the 
responsibility of the flood insurer in Mierzwa, writing that in order 
to give effect to the exclusion of flood damages from coverage, he 
                                                                                                                     
 147. FLA. JOINT SELECT COMM. ON HURRICANE INS., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
19 (2005), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/load-
doc.aspx?PublicationType=Committees&CommitteeId=2312&Session=2005&DocumentTy
pe=Reports&FileName=JointCommHurricaneFinalReport.pdf. 
 148. Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n, 877 So. 2d 774, 781-82 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2004) (Gross, J., concurring specially). 
 149. Id. at 782. 
 150. Id. 
2007]                          THE WIND AND THE WAVES 561 
 
would have given the windstorm insurer a credit for damages 
caused by the flooding.151  
 Judge Gross relied on Mondzelewski v. Fidelity & Guaranty In-
surance Corp.152 and Security Insurance Co. v. Rosenberg153 in devel-
oping his “proximate cause” analysis. In Rosenberg, a building dam-
aged in a fire was condemned by local ordinance, rendering it a total 
loss.154 At issue was whether the building was in an unsafe condition 
requiring condemnation before sustaining fire damage.155 On remand, 
the trial court was instructed that “if the injuries caused by the fire, 
combined with the antecedent defects, made the repairs impractica-
ble or illegal, the insurer is liable as for a total loss.”156 On the other 
hand, “if the condemnation was caused by conditions having no con-
nection with the fire, the insurer is liable only for the part destroyed 
by the fire.”157 Mondzelewski fleshes out this analysis: “the proper 
approach in a case of this kind is first to determine whether the in-
sured has sustained a total loss proximately resulting from the fire”; 
if so, “then the valued policy statute controls, regardless of the terms 
of the policy itself”; however, “if the answer is in the negative, the 
valued policy statute has no application.”158 These cases reflect Judge 
Gross’s analysis in Mierzwa and support his determination of the in-
surer’s liability for its full policy limits. If the wind damage at issue 
in Mierzwa had not been sufficient to render the structure a total 
loss but for the contribution of the flood damage, then the Valued 
Policy Law would not have been applicable.159 
 Judge Gross’s rule is further supported by Florida case law. In 
Netherlands Insurance Co. v. Fowler,160 the insured’s property was 
partially damaged by fire but was condemned under local ordi-
nance.161 The insured argued successfully that the ordinance was 
triggered by the fire damage, thus the loss should be considered a to-
tal one under the Valued Policy Law.162 Therefore, if the loss caused 
by the covered peril independently results in a constructive total loss, 
                                                                                                                     
 151. Id. 
 152. 105 A.2d 787 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954). 
 153. 12 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1929). 
 154. Id. at 688-89. 
 155. Id. at 691. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Mondzski v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Corp., 105 A.2d 787, 790 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954). 
 159. Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n, 877 So. 2d 774, 782 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2004) (Gross, J., concurring specially) (“A proximate cause analysis does not change 
this case, since it is clear that but for the wind damage, the ordinance would not have been 
brought into play.”).  
 160. 181 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). 
 161. Id. at 693. 
 162. Id. 
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the Valued Policy Law demands payment of full policy limits.163 
Fowler is silent on what would result in the event that the fire alone 
would not have caused the total loss to the property. The Cox major-
ity attempted to reconcile its holding with the Fowler case.164 It ar-
gued that the total loss was caused not by the fire, but by the opera-
tion of the ordinance.165 The Fowler holding, however, rested upon 
the logic that the fire damage alone led to the operation of the mu-
nicipal ordinance, thus rendering the property a total loss.166 The 
Fowler case held that the Valued Policy Law applies to properties 
that are a “constructive total loss” because of the operation of the or-
dinance.167 Hurricane damage combining covered wind damage with 
excluded flood damage is distinguishable from the logic behind the 
constructive total loss principle.  
 A good example of when the Valued Policy Law and constructive 
total loss principles are not to be applied is Regency Baptist Temple v. 
Insurance Co. of North America.168 In that case, the insured’s roof 
was partially damaged by standing water which was caused by the 
trusses being installed upside-down.169 After the insurer settled the 
claim by agreeing to pay for the replacement of the damaged portion 
of the roof, the municipality where the property was situated refused 
to issue a construction permit unless the roof was completely re-
placed.170 The court held that the insurer was liable only for the costs 
of the portion of the roof actually damaged, giving effect to an exclu-
sion for losses caused by operation of law or ordinance.171 The court 
explicitly stated that the facts in this case did not invoke the princi-
ples of constructive total loss or the Valued Policy Law.172 Regency 
Baptist stands for the principle that the loss to the property needs to 
be total and caused by the covered peril in order for the Valued Pol-
icy Law to apply.173 
                                                                                                                     
 163. See id. This is the justification for Judge Gross’s opinion being a concurrence, 
rather than a dissent, because the ordinance in Mierzwa would have been triggered regard-
less of the flood damage. See Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 782 (Gross, J., concurring specially). 
 164. See Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox,  943 So. 2d 823, 834-35 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).  
 165. Id. 
 166. See Fowler, 181 So. 2d at 693. 
 167. See id.  
 168. 352 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). 
 169. Id. at 1243. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Id. at 1243-44. 
 172. Id. at 1244. 
 173. A commentator has argued that Regency Baptist would have come out differently 
under the version of the Valued Policy Law that existed up to 2005 that covered “any 
peril.” The commentator thus posits that the court could have declared the roof a total loss 
under the Valued Policy Law, requiring the insurer to pay for the cost of repairing the en-
tire roof. See Wood, supra note 19, at 980. The Valued Policy Law, however, clearly applies 
only in cases of total loss to an entire structure. See FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (2005). Thus, the 
Valued Policy Law is evoked only when the structure actually has to be demolished. 
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 Judge Gross’s concurrence thus reduces the harshness of the ma-
jority’s holding in two key ways. First, his proximate cause analysis 
requires the covered peril to be primarily responsible for the damage 
leading to the Valued Policy Law being triggered. Thus, insurers are 
not liable under the Valued Policy Law beginning from the first scin-
tilla of damage, as noted by Garaffa and pled successfully at trial in 
Scylla Properties.174  Second, the Gross opinion gives credit for the 
flood exclusion, preserving the incentive for insureds to obtain sepa-
rate flood insurance and preventing insureds from using the Valued 
Policy Law as a way to bootstrap compensation for flood damages 
without paying premiums for the coverage.  
 Perhaps the most just application of Judge Gross’s rule is in situa-
tions where there is no flood insurer. The requirement of a covered 
peril to be the proximate cause of damage makes the most sense in 
these situations. Consider a scenario in which a house is covered un-
der a windstorm policy but has no flood insurance. Damage caused 
by a hurricane renders the home a constructive total loss, with sixty 
percent of the damage attributable to windstorm and the remainder 
attributable to flooding. Applying Judge Gross’s rule, the insurer is 
liable for its full policy limits under the Valued Policy Law less the 
actual cost of the damage caused by flood. This arrangement is fair to 
both parties: the insurer is able to give effect to exclusions for flood-
ing, while the insured remains protected under the Valued Policy 
Law in the event the property is rendered a total loss. Most impor-
tantly, this arrangement preserves the incentive for a property 
owner to obtain flood insurance—because the flood exclusion is given 
effect, the property owner is liable for the shortfall caused by this 
lack of coverage.  
 Likewise, Judge Gross’s rule is fair in the event that the loss is 
proximately caused by the excluded peril. In such a situation, the in-
surer will pay only for the actual damage caused by the covered peril 
and will have no liability under the Valued Policy Law. Although un-
fortunate, the insured has assumed the risk of loss due to the ex-
cluded peril by not obtaining additional insurance and should not be 
able to collect when the excluded peril is the dominant cause of the 
loss. Judge Gross’s rule comports with the holding of Garvey v. State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., a seminal case advocating the use of a 
proximate cause analysis in concurrent causation coverage determi-
nations: “the reasonable expectations of the insurer and the insured 
in the first-party property loss portion of a homeowner’s policy . . . 
cannot reasonably include an expectation of coverage in property loss 
                                                                                                                     
 174. See Garaffa, supra note 80, at 30; Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Re: 
Class a at 7, Scylla Properties., LLC v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 05 CA 01 (Fla. 2d Cir. 
Ct. 2005). 
564  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:541 
 
cases in which the efficient proximate cause of the loss is an activity 
expressly excluded under the policy.”175 
B.   Pro Rata Allocations of Liability Under the Valued Policy Law 
 Although a rational and appropriate application of the Valued Pol-
icy Law, Judge Gross’s concurrence does have one major conse-
quence. His rule requires that the insurer of the peril that is the 
proximate cause of the total loss be responsible under the Valued 
Policy Law, yet receive a credit for damages caused by other, ex-
cluded forces.176 Thus, whichever insurer covers the peril that is 
deemed to be the proximate cause of the loss must bear the full brunt 
of the Valued Policy Law, paying out its full policy limits less any 
credit for excluded damages. An additional insurer who covers these 
excluded damages, however, has no responsibility under the Valued 
Policy Law and is only required to pay out the actual cost of the dam-
ages caused by the peril it covered.  
 This does not lead to much injustice when the proximate cause is 
a large percentage of the overall damage. To use an example from the 
hurricane context, assume that a structure has sustained hurricane 
damage resulting in a constructive total loss. Seventy percent of the 
damage can be attributed to the windstorm damage and is consid-
ered the proximate cause of the total loss. The remaining thirty per-
cent of the damage is attributed to flooding. The windstorm insurer, 
under Judge Gross’s rule in Mierzwa, is liable for its full policy limits 
less the actual costs of the flood damage. The flood insurer has no re-
sponsibilities under this interpretation of the Valued Policy Law and 
is only liable for the actual damages caused by the flood.  
 Problems are likely to arise, however, when the two concurrent 
perils are nearly equally responsible for the damage to property that 
is rendered a constructive total loss. Assume now that a property 
valued at $100,000 has sustained hurricane damage. The costs of re-
pairs to the property are calculated to be sixty percent of the overall 
value of the property, rendering it a constructive total loss. Fifty-one 
percent of the total damage is attributable to wind, and forty-nine 
percent is attributable to flood. Under Judge Gross’s rule, both wind-
storm and flood insurers are liable for the actual costs of their re-
spective covered perils. Because wind is deemed the proximate cause 
of the damage, however, the wind insurer is liable under the Valued 
Policy Law for full policy limits less the actual costs of repair covered by 
the flood insurance. The flood insurer is not required to bear any burden 
                                                                                                                     
 175. 770 P.2d 704, 711 (Cal. 1989). 
 176. Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n, 877 So. 2d 774, 782 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2004) (Gross, J., concurring specially). 
2007]                          THE WIND AND THE WAVES 565 
 
under the Valued Policy Law under Judge Gross’s construction and is 
only responsible for paying the actual costs of flood damages. 
TABLE 1 
CALCULATION OF VALUES UNDER THE PROXIMATE CAUSE RULE 
Value of Property $100,000 
Costs of Damages to Property  
(60% of total value) $60,000 
Costs of Damages Attributable to Windstorm 
(51% of $60,000) $30,600 
Costs of Damages Attributable to Flood  
(49% of $60,000) $29,400 
Liability of Windstorm Insurer Under Valued 
Policy Law (policy limits of $100,000 less flood 
damage of $29,400) 
$70,600 
 Table 1 sets forth the liabilities for both windstorm and flood in-
surers. While this construction of the Valued Policy Law is fair to the 
insured—giving effect to both the policy underlying the Valued Policy 
Law and to the windstorm insurer’s exclusion of flood damages—it 
places an unfair burden on the insurer of the proximate cause of 
damage to meet the Valued Policy Law obligations. Recall that the 
Valued Policy Law applies to any insurer whose covered peril results 
in a total loss.177 Thus, an insurer of a peril that is not the proximate 
cause of the total loss should still have some liability under the Val-
ued Policy Law. 
 The trial court in Mierzwa ruled that the wind insurer would be 
liable only for a pro rata portion of the total loss.178 Pro rata respon-
sibility of all insurers of a total loss would comply with the both the 
letter of the law as well as the underlying policy considerations of the 
Valued Policy Law. Under a true pro rata interpretation of the Val-
ued Policy Law, the insurers are still liable for paying for the entire 
insured value of the lost property as a whole.179 They are required, 
                                                                                                                     
 177. FLA. STAT. § 627.702(1) (2005). 
 178. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 777. 
 179. Judge Polston’s interpretation of the Valued Policy Law also points towards pro 
rata allocation of damages. He noted that the Valued Policy Law sets the value of the 
property at issue in Cox at $65,000. Thus, “this value . . . should be used to determine the 
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however, to apportion their payments based on the overall percent-
age of their damages. Table 2 shows how the damages from the ex-
ample in Table 1 would be allocated under a pro rata system.  
TABLE 2 
CALCULATION OF VALUES UNDER THE PRO RATA RULE 
Liability of Wind Insurer  
(51% of the constructive total loss to the  
property caused by windstorm) 
$51,000 
Liability of Flood Insurer  
(49% of the constructive loss caused by flood) $49,000 
This interpretation of the Valued Policy Law is fair to the in-
sured, as he is made whole for his loss and is not required to prove 
the value of his property ex post. Pro rata liability is also the fairest 
interpretation of the Valued Policy Law for insurers, as it prevents 
“placing an insured in a position of profit through incurring a loss 
caused by a risk not contractually assumed by the insurer.”180 All in-
surers of a given property are subject to the Valued Policy Law, thus 
the insurer of the proximate cause of damage should not have to bear 
the entire burden of the Valued Policy Law.  
VI.   THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE'S REACTION TO MIERZWA 
 The Florida Legislature reacted swiftly to Mierzwa by amending 
the Valued Policy Law in 2005 to specifically disavow the construc-
tion put forward by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. This Part 
will explain the amendments to the statute and their effects on the 
application of the Valued Policy Law to hurricane damages. 
A.   Amending the Valued Policy Law 
 The Florida Legislature appointed a Joint Committee on Hurri-
cane Insurance in 2005 in response to 2004’s active hurricane sea-
son.181 The Committee examined “all aspects of the property insur-
ance market that promote the availability and affordability of cover-
age” for hurricane damage.182 
                                                                                                                     
amount of losses caused by” covered perils. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 943 So. 
2d 823, 839-40 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 180. Hual & Schofield, supra note 23, at 34. 
 181. FLA. JOINT SELECT COMM. ON HURRICANE INS., supra note 147, at 1. 
 182. Id. The committee heard testimony “from the Department of Financial Services 
(DFS), the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR), the Office of the Insurance Consumer Ad-
vocate, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, various insurance companies, insurance 
and agent associations, the Florida Consumer Action Network, and others.” Id. 
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 The Joint Committee specifically addressed the Mierzwa decision 
in its Final Report. The Committee noted that representatives of the 
insurance industry testified that the Mierzwa decision “will serve to 
increase the risk of total loss to insurers, reduce the capacity of the 
private market to write wind insurance policies, and increase the 
population and loss exposure of” the insurance industry.183 The 
Committee recommended that the legislature amend the Valued Pol-
icy Law to explicitly state that a property insurer is responsible only 
for the portion of damage to property caused by the covered peril.184 
Any amendment to the Valued Policy Law, the Committee also rec-
ommended, should clarify that an insurer is not liable for damages 
caused by excluded perils.185 Such amendment would clarify “that the 
Fourth DCA opinion in Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm Underwriting 
Association was incorrect.”186 The Committee also noted the role the 
Valued Policy Law serves in allowing policyholders to recover after a 
total loss and urged “careful consideration” to be taken in amending 
the law.187 
 The legislature followed the recommendations of the Joint Select 
Committee, amending section 627.702 to reflect its interpretation of 
the Valued Policy Law.188 The long title of the Act, in part, states that 
the amendments are an act “providing legislative intent regarding 
the requirement that an insurer pay policy limits if there is a total 
loss of a building; providing nonapplication of certain insurer liability 
requirements under certain circumstances; [and] limiting an in-
surer’s liability to certain loss covered by a covered peril.”189 
 The Act made two key alterations in the text of section 627.702(1). 
First, it deleted the words “if any” from the phrase “the insurer’s li-
ability, if any, under the policy for such total loss . . . shall be in the 
amount of money for which such property was so insured.”190 The 
Mierzwa court placed a great deal of emphasis on the “if any” lan-
guage in holding that the Valued Policy Law requires the payment of 
full policy limits whenever there is a total loss, caused in any way, by 
a covered peril.191 Second, the Act amended the law to read that “the 
insurer’s liability under the policy for such total loss, if caused by a 
covered peril, shall be in the amount of money for which such prop-
                                                                                                                     
 183. Id. at 19. 
 184. Id. at 23. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 19. 
 188. Act effective June 1, 2005, ch. 2005-111, 2005 Fla. Laws 1063. 
 189. Id. at 1064. 
 190. Id. at 1093 (emphasis added). For the version of the statute before the Act, see 
FLA. STAT. § 627.702(1) (2004).  
 191. Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n, 877 So. 2d 774, 775-76 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2004). 
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erty was so insured.”192 Taken together, these alterations serve to 
eliminate the language the Mierzwa court relied upon in mandating 
that any damage caused by a covered peril triggered the Valued Pol-
icy Law when total loss occurred.193 
The Valued Policy Law was also amended to include a broad 
statement of legislative intent. It reads: 
The intent of this subsection is not to deprive an insurer of any 
proper defense under the policy, to create new or additional cover-
age under the policy, or to require an insurer to pay for a loss 
caused by a peril other than the covered peril. In furtherance of 
such legislative intent, when a loss was caused in part by a cov-
ered peril and in part by a noncovered peril, paragraph (a) does not 
apply. In such circumstances, the insurer’s liability under this sec-
tion shall be limited to the amount of the loss caused by the cov-
ered peril. However, if the covered perils alone would have caused 
the total loss, paragraph (a) shall apply. The insurer is never liable 
for more than the amount necessary to repair, rebuild, or replace 
the structure following the total loss, after considering all other 
benefits actually paid for the total loss.194 
Finally, the legislature added a provision explicitly noting that the 
amendments to the Valued Policy Law were not to be applied retro-
actively.195 The Amendments to the Valued Policy Law took effect 
June 1, 2005;196 therefore all claims and litigation arising out of the 
2004 Hurricane Season still fall under the former Valued Policy Law. 
B.   How the 2005 Amendments Change the Interpretation of the  
Valued Policy Law to Losses Caused by Hurricane 
 The legislature’s amendments to the Valued Policy Law essen-
tially codify the interpretation of the Valued Policy Law put forth in 
Judge Gross’s concurrence in Mierzwa. The law as amended now re-
quires courts to determine whether “the covered perils alone would 
have caused the total loss.”197 The courts are thus required to conduct 
a proximate cause analysis. If the property would not have been a to-
tal loss but for the loss caused by the covered peril, the Valued Policy 
                                                                                                                     
 192. FLA. STAT. § 627.702(1) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 193. See Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775-76. The Mierzwa court reasoned that “if the insur-
ance carrier has any liability at all to the owner for a building damaged by a covered peril 
and deemed a total loss, that liability is for the face amount of the policy” and emphasized 
that the Valued Policy Law “statutory text does not require that a covered peril be the cov-
ered peril causing the entire loss; it need merely be a covered peril.” Id. 
 194. Act effective June 1, 2005, Ch. 2005-111, 2005 Fla. Laws 1063, 1093. 
 195. Id. (“It is the intent of the Legislature that the amendment to this section shall 
not be applied retroactively and shall apply only to claims filed after effective date of such 
amendment.”). 
 196. Id. at 1103. 
 197. FLA. STAT. § 627.702(1)(b) (2005). 
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law applies.198 Otherwise, “the insurer’s liability . . . shall be limited 
to the amount of the loss caused by the covered peril.”199 Finally, an 
insurer is now “never liable for more than the amount necessary to 
repair, rebuild, or replace the structure following the total loss, after 
considering all other benefits actually paid for the total loss.”200 Under 
this language, a windstorm insurer would likely be eligible for a credit 
for payments made to the insured under a separate flood policy.201  
 One consequence, though, of the legislature’s amendment of the 
Valued Policy Law is the potential for courts to imply that, by chang-
ing the language of the statute, the Mierzwa court correctly inter-
preted the prior version. The courts in Cox, Ueberschaer, and Scylla 
Properties have done precisely that.202 When the legislature amends a 
statute in response to case, it frequently creates a dilemma: does the 
amendment change the actual law, or does it merely clarify the law 
to give guidance to the courts in its interpretation? The Cox court 
noted that the 2005 statute was significantly different from the prior 
version.203 In light of the significant changes, coupled with the clear 
intent for the amendment to not apply retroactively, the court held 
that it was “not at liberty to transmogrify the earlier version of the 
statute into its inapposite successor, by reading the controlling ver-
sion of the statute as if it were the later-enacted replacement now on 
the books.”204 The Cox majority rejected that the legislature’s 
amendment should be interpreted as a clarification of the prior stat-
ute. The court held that the prohibition on applying the new statute 
retroactively nullified a rule of interpretation that allowed an 
amendment to be interpreted as a clarification when promulgated 
immediately after a controversy surrounding a statute’s interpreta-
tion.205 Finally, it declined to view an amendment made twenty-two 
years after the prior statute was enacted as a clarification.206 Judge 
Polston, dissenting in Cox, disagreed with the majority’s holding that 
the legislature’s amendments to the Valued Policy Law foreclosed the 
court from finding that the prior version of the law does not mandate 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n, 877 So. 2d 744, 782 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2004) (Gross, J., concurring specially). 
 202. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co. v. Ueberschaer, 956 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Fla. 
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 943 So. 2d 823, 827 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Summary 
Final Judgment at 4-5, Scylla Props., LLC v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., No. 05 CA 01 (Fla. 2d 
Cir. 2005). 
 203. Cox, 943 So. 2d at 826  (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).  
 204. Id. at 829. 
 205. Id. at 829-30 (citing Lowry v. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 473 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 
1985)). 
 206. Id. at 831 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaForet, 658 So. 2d 55, 62 
(Fla. 1995)). 
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that an insurer pay full policy limits when damages are caused by an 
excluded peril.207 Rather, the new language in the amended version of 
the statute demonstrates that the prior version of the statute did not 
address causation issues.208 Thus, the new language in the amend-
ment is not a clarification, but rather adds language where previ-
ously none existed. 
 The Mierzwa case and its progeny are examples of courts applying 
a law in a situation unforeseen by the original drafters. A statute 
cannot be expected to anticipate all future directions the law may 
take; therefore, “[s]ome ambiguity must be expected in statutes. The 
legislature cannot be expected to foresee every factual situation that 
may arise, for ‘[s]tatutes come out of the past and aim at the future.’ 
”209 The Report of the Joint Select Committee on Hurricane Insurance 
is particularly important in this determination, stating that amend-
ments to the Valued Policy Law should be made to clarify that the 
Mierzwa decision was “incorrect.”210 The choice of words is signifi-
cant—if the legislature’s intent in amending the statute was to clar-
ify an ambiguity or to fill a gap in the law as it stood, it could have 
done so. The legislature's unwillingness to make the amendments 
retroactive likely reflects a desire to avoid a separation of powers 
conflict rather than an acknowledgement that the law as it stood be-
fore the amendment was properly applied in Mierzwa.211  
VII.   CONCLUSION: APRÈS MIERZWA, LE DELUGE? 
 The Valued Policy Law will continue to have a large impact on the 
insurance industry in Florida. Meteorologists believe that the Atlan-
tic Basin is experiencing the “busy” part of the multi-year hurricane 
cycle;212 more storms are certain to threaten the Florida coast in the 
coming years. The financial protection provided against catastrophic 
storm damage by insurance is essential to the wellbeing of Florida 
and its citizens. Rulings which impair the insurance industry’s abil-
ity to predict potential exposures may result in unnecessary higher 
premiums, a reduced willingness to cover property in Florida, or 
both. Citizens Property Insurance Company—which was created by 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Id. at 846 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
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 209. Robert M. Rhodes et al., The Search for Intent: Aids to Statutory Construction in 
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the legislature as an insurer of last resort213—has now become the 
second-largest property insurer in Florida.214 Citizens will now be 
doubly pressured as a result of Ueberschaer: not only will it be bur-
dened by taking on policies which the private insurance market will 
no longer touch, but Citizens will also suffer the same financial dam-
age under the Valued Policy Law that forced the private insurers to 
drop policies in Florida in the first place. 
 Causation issues, however, have long vexed the property insur-
ance industry.215 Even in the absence of Valued Policy Law concerns, 
conflict and litigation is likely to continue over the extent that dam-
age to a property was caused by windstorm (a covered peril under 
most standard homeowners policies), rather than flooding (a peril 
typically excluded). Perhaps the time has come to eliminate the prac-
tice of artificially bifurcating hurricanes into separate “windstorm” 
and “flood” events.216 As insurance for hurricane damages is becom-
ing dominated by government entities such as Citizens and the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program,217 it will become increasingly logical 
to classify hurricanes as discrete and singular events. Alternatively, 
the insurance system may be better served by moving away from “all 
risks” coverage to coverage defined strictly in terms of losses.218 The 
cost of reduced control in defining risks excluded would be offset by 
reduced litigation costs.219 
 The Florida Legislature’s amendments to the Valued Policy Law 
are a step in the right direction. By adopting the position of Judge 
Gross’s concurrence, the legislature has acted to address some of the 
problems hurricanes pose for the insurance industry.220 Mierzwa and 
Cox, though, have exposed insurers in Florida to massive liability re-
sulting from the 2004 Hurricane Season. Because the legislature 
stepped in, the damage to the insurance system as a whole will be 
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limited. As noted in Cox, its holding will not cause insureds to "rush 
out to cancel their flood insurance, counting on windstorm insurers to 
cover any total loss" thanks to the legislature’s amendment.221 Since 
the law as interpreted in Mierzwa and its progeny will be a mere aber-
ration, rather than the norm, the current insurance system will con-
tinue to protect the interests of both insurers and homeowners. 
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